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It was with distinct pleasure that I received an invitation to contribute this chapter to help celebrate Werner Baer's seventy-fifth birthday. Werner has played a critical and unique role in the evolution of development economics and the study of the economies of Latin America. In a career spanning six decades, he has been instrumental in producing research that has succeeded in being of the highest quality while also managing to be engaging and accessible. From his base in Vanderbilt University and then the University of Illinois, Werner has fostered the careers of generations of economists. His influence has been especially marked in Latin America where economics departments and finance ministries across the region are replete with his former students. He has also been extraordinarily energetic in fostering ongoing academic ties between the U.S. and Latin America. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that Werner has made a significant contribution to hemispheric relations.
Adopting a career as a policy-focused economist working on Latin America is (as Werner would be the first to testify) an occasionally rewarding but invariably challenging path. The 1980s and 1990s were not kind to those academic economists whose research emphasized the importance of institutions, the centrality of country knowledge and a sense of history. At the time, so it seemed, Fukayama's "End of History" was at hand. The world, it appeared, had emerged finally into the sunlit uplands of globalization and orthodox macroeconomic policy. Analyzing the events at hand, best practice in development economics more often than not meant folding up "institutional variables" (most usually a corruption or rule of law variable) into one or two dummies inserted in elaborate cross-country regressions. Those interested in popping open the institutional hood and getting their hands dirty, were viewed as increasingly divorced from the mainstream.
Since the turn of the new millennium, though, the pendulum has begun to reverse direction. The sense that globalization may be stuttering, the unraveling of Western policy in the Middle East, the post-Seattle rise of the anticapitalist movement, and ideological shifts within the multilateral institutions are among the factors propelling a new interest in institutions and country specificities. Both the World Bank and the IMF are now ever more reluctant to advocate one-size-fits-all models. Simultaneously, economists have become much more interested in the institutional and historical intricacies of the development process.
Against this background, Werner's intellectual contributions seem now, in his seventy-fifth year, more timely than ever. It is significant that many of the important "facts on the ground" driving this renewed interest in institutions have originated in Werner's own research bailiwick, Latin America. Within this region, the past five years or so have witnessed the emergence of left-leaning governments whose common theme has been their ostensible opposition to globalization and their commitment to deep-rooted structural reform.
With the rise of Chavez in Venezuela, the recent election of Morales in Bolivia, or even the accession to power of Lula in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, Vasquez in Uruguay and Bachelet in Chile, it is now tempting to talk of a decisive shift away from global economic integration and a collective junking of neoliberalism. This, certainly, is the message that has given the academic proponents of globalization pause for thought. But what, if any, is the difference between rhetoric and reality? Do these new governments of the left represent a genuine break with market economics or is the reality more subtle? Is the bell really tolling for neoliberalism in Latin America? Proudly following the tradition of Werner Baer, it will not do to generalize. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to move beyond the hype and to descend into the often surprising reality, investigating the real political economy of the New Left in Latin America. The discussion begins with a brief background section dealing with the legacy of the Washington Consensus and the market liberalization agenda. Next, the experiences of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia are reviewed. Finally, the conclusion draws together the threads of the argument.
Latin America, the "Washington Consensus" and the rise of the new left At the beginning of the twentieth century, the political economy of Latin America was still rooted in the liberal free trade model which had slowly emerged following independence some eight decades previously. Within 40 years, however, catastrophic external events allied to growing nationalism had entirely altered the political and economic landscape. Eschewing the liberal free trade order of the nineteenth century, the region systematically disengaged itself from the global economy, raising tariff barriers and substituting domestic for foreign investment. Following World War II, the
